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l The discussion of vulnerability will begin with a description , of sqme of the electrical characteristics of fibers before defin-
l
ing how vulnerability calculations are done. The vulnerability 
results secured to date will be presented. The discussion will 
touch o n post exposure vulnerability which many have not heard 
I 
about and then hazard some guesses about what future technology 
will do to the measurements made to date. After a description of 
some shock hazard work now underway, the discussion will lead into 
a description of the planned effort and present some preliminary 
conclusions. 
On the upper left hand corner of figure 1 I have diagrammed a 
. fiber and an external circuit . Electrically , fibers appear as a 
~ resistance per unit length plus two contacts which have some non-
! linear characteristics. The fibers that we have been working with 
1 show resistances of about 1000 to about 3000 ohms per centimeter 
of l ength depending upon the extent of graphitization. 
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Their contact resistance is nonlinear. They burn out a t about 1/2 
to 1 watt per centimeter of length, and a one centimeter fiber 
will burn out with a pulse input of a bout 100 millijoul es. If o ne 
plots the current through the f i ber against the voltage across 
the fiber, there is a small nonlinear region at low vo l t a ge, a 
linear region which increa ses with increa se i n voltage , and then 
just before the fiber burns out a nd p robably due to i t s nega tive 
temperature coefficient of resistance, a little further nonlinear-
ity in the current voltage chara cteristics. Some of the fibers 
burn out at about 30 millia mperes ; others will burn out a t currents 
between 10 and 20 milliamperes. The contact character i stics of t h e 
f iber are somewhat similar to back-to-back diodes. The cur rent 
that will pass through the fiber contact stay s very low until a 
characteristic voltage is app lied . For the fibers we hav e been 
working with it has the order of about l ~ to 2 volts. At this 
point the voltage drop at the contact remains fairly constant and 
relatively independent of current. Because of these characteristics 
the fib ers hav e the potential for doing v a rious t ypes of da mage . 
Figure 2 is a fairl y gross categorization chart. I h a ve tried 
to generalize the t y pes of damage that might occur with fibers 
based upon the voltage ranqe that they may be used at a nd whether 
or not they are in a low power or high power circuit. One of the 
areas of concern is the low voltage and low power region. A fiber 
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has the capability to maintain a high resistance short without 
burning out. The equipment can malfunction and although no local 
damage to components usually occurs the functioning of the device 
I may be impaired. At low voltage and high power (for example a 12 
volt battery circuit) shorts may also be sustained. The fiber may 
or may not burn out depending on the voltage; however, equipment 
is not usually damaged. This is not a problem area from the view-
point that if a fiber does fall across a high power low voltage 
circuit, it may draw a little bit of power from the circuit but it 
probably would not stop the operation. The other area of concern 
is high power and relatively high voltage where the fiber essen-
tially acts as a trigger to some potential arcing and that arcing 
may be sustained. This will stress components, blow fuses and 
cause flashover at insulators. There is another region where fi-
ber can damage some types of equipment and that is in the high vol-
tage high power area. Here one can encounter corona and initiate 
sustained arcs which can disrupt equipment and damage equipment. 
As I say this is a very gross chart. The 0 to 30 volts may 
well be 0 to 10 or 15 and the 100 watts may well be anything from 
about half that to twice that; but the general characteristics of 
the types of problems listed are typical. 
Figure 3 lists methods which are employed for evaluating 
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equipment vulnerability. The most direct one, and the one I think 
has been used in most cases, is direct exposure of the equipment in 
a chamber. There are chambers at Langley Research Center, at Rome 
Air Development Center, and at Ballistic Research Labs in Aberdeen, 
Maryland. There may be a few others with which I am not familiar. 
A second way of evaluating equipment vulnerability is with a 
fiber simulator. If the electronics or equipment has a limited 
number of nodes, 50 or perhaps no more than 100, it is possible 
to probe this equipment and determine whether or not the fiber as 
simulated will produce a hazard, cause the equipment to malfunction , 
or burn out because of the power supply characteristics in the 
equipment. 
The third method is what some people call engineering judg-
ment, others call guesses, and I call generic similarity. That 
is, if your tests are performed on one type of computer of a given 
complexity and there is another of about the same complexity and 
the same technology, one could hazard some guesses with regard to 
its vulnerability. 
The last method is called modeling and is outlined in figure 
4. Even for equipment which may be as simple as a horne television 
set, it is probably impossible to just look at the case and hazard 
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VULNERABILITY MODELING 
I. ANALYZE EQUIPMENT INTO DEFINABLE UNITS USING FAULT TREES AND SEPARABLE 
CHARACTER I STI CS. 
2. FOR EACH UNIT: 
A) TYPE OF VENTILATION (CONVECTIVE, FORCED, LEAKAGE) 
B) TYPE OF TECHNOLOGY (VACUUM TUBE, DISCRETE, INTEGRATED) 
c) VOLTAGE RANGE « 15V, 15-200V, > 200V) 
D) TYPE OF WIRING C CIRCUIT BOARD, SOLID WIRE) & 
CONNECTORS ( SPADE LUG, HERMETIC WIRE WRAP) 
E) ORIENTATION OF OPEN LEADS & CIRCUIT TRACES 
3. USE GENERIC TEST DATA ON CIRCUIT BOARDS & CONNECTORS TO ESTIMATE FAILURE 
STATISTICS. 
4. COMBINE, USING FAULT TREE, INTO OVERALL FAILURE RATE PREDICTION. 
STATUS: PRELIMINARY LOGIC MODEL DEVELOPED 
Figure 4 
a guess as to its vulnerability. One way of breaking it down into 
things that can be handled is to break the equipment down into de-
finable units using the fault trees and the characteristics of 
the individual units which make up the tree. Then each type of 
smaller unit could be analyzed at that level: the type of ven-
tilation, the type of technology, the voltage range of the equip-
ment, the type of wiring that might be in it, the orientation of 
the open leads and circuit traces, and whether or not there are 
open leads or coated circuit boards can be considered. Then, 
, using generic test data on similar circuit boards and connectors, 
the statistics of failures of each of those parts can be com-
bined into an overall failure rate prediction. We have not done 
very much with this other than develop a preliminary logic model. 
Other people that have worked in this area have used this type of 
modeling in order to model a complete radar system for example. 
Figure 5 is a computer-generated experimental vulnerability 
result. The testing was done on a PDP-ll computer, and it is a 
plot for tests that were done at 7.8 and 4.5 millimeter length 
fibers. Each of the staircase steps is at least one failure and 
generates the approximate probability of damage curve when plotted 
against the exposure in particle seconds per cubic meter. The 
shape of this curve is typical. It is not the best fit that has 
been secured, but it is typical and is fitted by the equation 
shown on the upper left where the probability of damage is shown 
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as an exponential. Figure 6 shows typical vul nerability results. 
The lengths of the test fibers are defined by ' short ' , ' medium ' , 
'long'. The reason for this is that it is very difficul t to cut 
the same length of 3 millimeter fibers so that testing might have 
been done anywhere from 2~ to 3 1/3 millimeters, the 7 millimeter 
testing perhaps plus or minus a millimeter , and the long testing 
may be from 10 to 14 millimeters. 
The small desk type computer, the PDP-l l , was most vulnerable 
to the longer fibers in those tests . The vulnerability was ap -
proximately 105 and for the long and the medium l engths. The com-
puter_was a ~ittle bit less vulnerable to the shor t er lengths, 
with E at 10. It is interesting that the first two items on this 
chart are both cooled with unfiltered fan - forced air , and neither 
one of the devices has coated circuit boards . 
The next item on the figure is a color te l evision which just 
barely came into our definition ofSvulnerable equipment . We essen-
tially stopped testing at about 10. If one puts any reasonable 
exposures and damage numbers into the problem of the national risk 
analysis, lOS turns out to be a vulnerabi l ity l evel which results 
in very small amounts of potential money loss . However , we sti17 carry along in our risk estimates those devices whi ch fail at 10 . 
The rest of the equipmen7 seems to be vulnerab l e at E from 
about 105 up through about 10. The smallest number on the chart, 
2 x 10 4 , occurs for the very l ong fibers for a stereo amplifier. 
There is more of this data available in some of the reports which 
are not being presented here . 
One of the outstanding things that has happened in the last 
period of time is the fact that many pieces of equipment were 
tested with a large number of them appearing not vulnerable. 
Figure 7 lists some of these . In fact, enough samples of consumer 
equipment were selected, such as radios , recorders , home music 
systems, etc. that they became indicative of about 75 percent of 
the available goods on the market. Most of the devices that have 
been tested so far have shown no vulnerability . It is believed 
that this is due to the fact that some of the latest items are 
somewhat newer technology, low wattage and do not require a cool-
ing ventilation. No problems have been encountered with 110 volt 
electric motors and two thermostats. A number of appliances have 
been testec with probes . No problems have been encountered except 
in one case where a fiber would short out a resistor- capacitor 
timing circuit. In that one case there was a sma ll timing error 
but no particular hazardous condition. 
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VULNERABILITY RESU LTS - VULNERABLE 
RD - llA COMPUTER (DEC) CD® CD 
STEREO AMPLIFIER CD ® CD 
COLOR TV 
DIGITAL VOLTMETER ® 
LOW VOLTAGE POWER SUPPLY ® 
VOLTAGE REGULATOR ® 
ASR-3 RADAR, NO FILTER ® 
104 105 106 
I I I 
AVERAGE EXPOSURE AT FAI LURE 
FIBER LENGTHS: CJ[) SHORT H MM), ® MEDIUM H MM), CD 
Figure 6 
VULNERABILITY RESULTS - NOT VULNERABLE 
NOT VULNERABLE 
, AM/FM RADIO 
, CALCULATOR WITH PRINTER 
, TAPE RECORDER 
, HOME MUS IC SYSTEM 
, 10 BAND RADIO 
, ELECTRIC MOTORS 110V 
, 24V AND 115V THERMOSTATS 
, BLACK AND WHITE TV SET 
, DISHWASHER (PROBE TEST) 
, TOASTER (PROBE TEST) 
, CAR RADIO 
, GENERAL AVIATION DME 
• ASR-3 RADAR, WITH FILTER 
Figure 7 
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The general aviation Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) was 
tested as one of a series of tests of general aviation equipment, 
to try to determine whether or not the type of equipment that might 
exist in light aircraft might be subject to failure. It did not 
fail. The ASR-3 radar, which is an obsolete radar, when tested 
with its normal filter as used in the field, did not fail. It is 
interesting that the radars that are replacing the ASR-3, which 
are now ASR-7's and 8's, and going into service have coated circuit 
boards and better control of ventilation with good filters. We be-
lieve that the newest radars will also not be vulnerable. That 
concludes the data that will be presented on vulnerability. 
The next subject for discussion is post- exposure vulnerability . 
Most of the testing done to date has been done with equipment 'on', 
and whether or not it has been vulnerable has been determined by 
whether or not it has had a failure during the testing. There is 
the problem of equipment being exposed in either an ' on ' or 'off ' 
condition not failing during the exposure and then failing in some 
period of time after the exposure . One way of thinking about the 
problem is to think about the fibers that enter the equipment as 
illustrated on figure 8. There is only a limited number of things 
that can happen to ingested fibers . They can be exhausted immedi-
ately, Hhich I think is what happens to most of the fibers. They 
can cause a problem, in which case the equipment would be taken 
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apart, would be repaired and cleaned and that would be the end of 
those fibers. They might burn out because of the voltage or power 
range in the equipment, or they might get trapped within the box . 
If they are trapped within the box they may get trapped permanently. 
Cases have been observed where it is extremely difficult to remove 
a fiber from its position in a box after exposure. The fibers 
could be released either by subsequent air flow, vibration, elec-
trostatics (turning the equipment 'on' and 'off'), or by a sub-
I sequent repair that might have been occasioned by some other fault. 
The logic loop can be repeated many times and one can hypothesize 
that every operation results in working with less and less fibers. 
In an attempt to see whether or not this problem was worth study-
ing, we did some preliminary pathfinder tests with two boxes. 
Figure 9 outlines the test scheme. The color television and 
the stereo amplifier (for which vulnerabilitysdata was presented 
within figure 6) were exposed to about E = 10 fiber seconds per 
cubic meter. They were given nine exposures in an 'off', and nine 
exposures in an 'on' state with the supposition that there was a 
possible electrostatic effect that could determine where the fi-
bers might land and might adhere. A year's operation was then 
simulated after each exposure. These tests are very time con-
suming. They took about 200 hours of testing, yet it is apparent 
that we really did not simulate the number of on-off switches that 
POST-EXPOSURE VULNERABILITY 
TEST METHOD 
I FIBER EXPOSURE 105 FIBER SECONDS/METER3 
I NINE EXPOSURES IN "OFF" + NINE IN "ON" STATE 
I SIMULATE ONE YEAR'S OPERATION AFTER EACH EXPOSURE 
• 100 ON/OFF SWITCHES (EACH TWO MINUTES) 
• 50 PHYSICAL MOVEMENTS 
• 50 BLOWER OPERATIONS 
RESULTS 
I NO POST-EXPOSURE FAILURES CAUSED BY GRAPHITE FIBERS FOR COLOR TV OR 
STEREO AMPLIFIER 
Figure 9 
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occur in a normal television in a year. The 50 physical movements 
is probably about right, and the lower operations where opened 
windows or fans were simulated are reasonably realistic. 
Results to date are that no failures have occurred on either 
box. This work will continue with some more devices but so far 
the results look promising. It may not be a big problem. 
Figure 10 offers conjectures with respect to the effects of 
future technology. Some of this technology is already in use 
and the effects are apparent in the testing of consumer appliances. 
I believe there will be more coated circuit boards than at present. 
One of the reasons for this is that manufacturers are beginning 
to do wave soldering and it is economical to coat the board in 
order not to waste solder. There is an increased use of integrated 
circuits as compared to discrete items, therefore less leads, low-
er power requirements, and no need for cooling openings into the 
case. When people build equipment nowadays they are more sensible 
about specifying filters. This seems to be particularly true of 
field equipment such as being specified by the FAA for airport 
use. Improved ventilation practices in general, in homes and in 
offices, should improve the situation; the only thing that looks 
a little black is the tremendous rate of increase of the amount 
of electronics in use. 
FUTURE TECHNOLOGY EFFECTS ON VULNERABILITY 
INCREASED USE OF COATED CIRCUIT BOARDS 
INCREASED USE OF INTEGRATED CIRCUITS 
LOWERED POWER REQUIREMENTS 
IMPROVED FILTRATION SPECIFICATIONS 
IMPROVED VENTILATION PRACTICES 
MORE ELECTRONICS IN USE 
Figure 10 
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One more subject which has not previously been discussed is 
the potential of a shock hazard. Figure 11 diagrams how 110 volt 
power is conducted into a normal home or office. There are usually 
three leads, a "hot" lead at 110 volts, a neutral lead which is 
usually at the same potential as ground, and a ground lead. When 
these come into the home, and an appliance of any kind is plugged 
in, and if a cheater plug is not used, then the external case is 
connected to ground. The neutral lead and the hot lead enter the 
case and either a one pole or a two pole switch makes the connec-
tion to the internal circuit. 
If fibers are ingested into the case there is a potential 
short between the wiring in the case and the case. If a human 
being touches the case and has a resistance to ground, he completes 
the circuit through himself from the 110 volt source. 
Figure 11 also lists some typical resistivities resulting from 
barely touching a case with everything dry, in which case the re-
sistance is in megohms, to touching it with various degrees of wet-
ness and area. For each of these contacts with different resis-
tivity, the current through the human being can range all the way 
from where he might feel a mild shock to where he can be at a "no-
let-go" condition (no voluntary control over the muscles). In 
fact, at 30 milliamperes he may be subject to ventricular fibril-
POTENTIAL SHOCK HAZARD 
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CONTACT RE: OHMS CURRENT AMP EFFECT 
DRY, TOUCH CASE MEGOHMS NONE 
DRY, FINGER-THUMB GRASP 30 K ,003 MILD 
WET, FINGER TOUCH 20 K ,005 ANNOYANCE 
DRY, HAND HOLDING PLIER 10 K ,009 "NO-LET-GO" 
DRY, PALM TOUCH 3 K ,030 VENTRICULAR FIBRILLATION 
FOOT, ON DAMP LEATHER 12 K ,009 "NO-LET-GO" 
FOOT, ON WET CONCRETE 1 K ,no FIBER BURNS OUT 
Figure 11 
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lation. There are really very few appliances that are of concern. 
Electric heaters and some metallic-cased small electric tools offer 
some hazard; however, the most serious concern is the familiar home 
toaster. It is believed that the toaster is the biggest problem 
that exists because of the large numbers in use. 
Figure 12 lists some assumptions which were made to determine 
whether further work in this regard is needed. It was assumed 
that there are 2000 pounds of fiber in each of five fire-accompa-
nied accidents per year, that ten percent of the graphite fiber 
was released, that there are a thousand people per square kilometer I 
(typical of many urban areas), and that the average every day family 
has a toaster, with three people in a family. A 0.01 transfer func-
tion from the outside to the inside of the home was also assumed; 
however, 0 . 01 may be a little bit large with respect to computed 
transfer functions into a home with windows and doors closed. The 
transfer function could be unity if the home had wide open windows 
or doors . 
The determination of the hazard is made by applying an esti -
mation formula which includes: the probability of a shock hazard 
as linearly related to the density of the toasters per unit area ; 
the transfer function into the enclosure where the toaster exists; 
an inverse proportion to the E necessary to produce the shock 
hazard; a direct proportion to the number of fibers that are re -
1 20 
PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE OF TOASTER SHOCK HAZARD 
ASSUMPTI ONS 
2000 # FIBER I N EACH OF 5 FIRE ACC I DENTS/YR 
10% FIBER RELEASE 
1000 PEOPLE (330 TOASTERS) PER KM2 
0.01 TRANSFER FUNCTION, OUTSIDE TO TOASTER 
P SHOCK = [TOASTERS] [T ~. ] [lLJ' 
HAZARD AREA E V s
WHERE : T.F. TRANSFER FUNCTION 
N, TOTAL NUMBER OF FIBERS 
RELEASED 
Vs FALL VELOC lTY 
-E, AVERAGE EXPOSURE WHICH 
CAUSES A SHORT 
P SHOCK 
HAZARD 
= [330 ] flO-2 ] [ 1012 ] = 
la' liD' 2Xl0-2 ( 
1.6 POTENTIAL HAZARDS/YEAR 
( FOR E = 108 TOASTER) 
(FOR E = 105 TOASTER) 1600 - ) 
NOTE: 108 AND 105 DETERMINED WITH 7 MM FIBERS. 
Figure 1 2 
leased In the accident; and an inverse proportion to the fall ve-
locity of the fibers. 
This formula for integrated exposure has been checked a num-
ber of times against specific footprints that have been computed 
and it is a good conservative estimator . If the footprint covers 
a uniformly settled area, it will provide a conservative estimate 
of the amount of damage. This formula is similar to one expres-
sion used to calculate dissemination footprints . Two toasters 
were tested. There were actually three submitted. One toaster 
that was tested required an E of about 10 8 in order to produce a 
shock hazard ; and, if all the correct numbers are applied to the 
I formula, it computes about 1.6 potential hazards per_year f~r that 
toaster. The second toaster that was tested has an E of 10. That 
equates to be about 1600 potential hazards per year. That does not 
mean that there is a hazard. There is a potential hazard. The 
accompanying proper resistivity of the human being to do some damage 
is required as well. We did check the third toaster, but inter-
estingly enough, it required an E of zero because it was shorted 
I when submitted to the laboratory. These tests were all done with 
6 millimeter fibers. These tests will be repeated with shorter 
fibers. The computations show values large enough so that we have 
to further analyze the problem. 
Figure 13 lists some reasons for believing that the computed 
PRELIMINARY SHOCK HAZARD CONCLUSIONS 
I, THE RISK IS LOWER THAN ESTIMATED FOR THE 'lOS TOASTER': 
A) LATEST SOURCE DATA INDICATES SHORTER FIBERS ARE PREDOMINATE 
IN RELEASE SPECTRUM, 
B) NEW SAFETY STANDARDS ISSUED IN 1973 REGARDING TOASTER 
CONSTRU cn ON, 
() ONLY 10 TO 50% OF TOASTERS I N USE ARE OF 105 TY PE , 
D) SIMULTANEOUS PROBABILITY OF REQUIRED HUMAN RESISTANCE TO 
GROUND IS LOW, 
E) PLUG MUST BE INSERTED SUCH THAT HAZARD IS PRESENT, 
2, ADDITIONAL EFFORT IS REQUIRED : 
A) SECURE MORE DATA REGARDING SHOCK HAZARD VS , EXPOSURE VS, 
FIBER LENGTH 
B) SECURE MORE INFORMATION REGARDING USE RATE AND OBSOLESCENCE 
OF TOASTERS, 
C) COMPUTE NATIONAL RISK USING DETAILED RISK ANALYSIS METHODS, 
F i gure 13 
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hazard is probably too l a r ge . The lates t sour ce da t a i ndica t e s 
that shorter fibers are predominate in the release s pectrum . I be-
lieve that the shock hazard is probably less than indicated for 
t he shorter fibers. The s econd item is that there were new safety 
standards introduced in 1973 regard i ng toaster constr uc tion . We 
really do not know how many are out in the field of each type . 
Estimates were made by some people at the Bureau of Standards Con-
sumer Safety Group; they estimated that .for the t o a s ters considered 
susceptible they would guess only 10 to 50 pe rcent of the ones in 
use are of that type . Perhaps the r e is one other smal l facto r, 
and that is that the plug must be inserted so that the hazard is 
present . 
Possibly the biggest safety factor of a l l is that whatever 
number i s computed by the methods shown mus t be mu ltip l ied by t he 
simultaneous probability of getting the right human resistance to 
ground. We honestly do not know the probabilities for this event . 
More data is required regarding the shock hazard versus exposure 
and fiber length . More data regar ding the use rate and the obso-
lescence of toasters is also needed. Apparently the newer ones 
may be safer . Finally the nationa l risk shoul d be computed using 
detailed risk analysis methods rather than the kind of estimating 
scheme shown . 
Figure 14 shows work that is planned . There is a specific 
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PLANNED EFFORTS 
VULNERAB ILITY TEST ING 
APPLIANCES & ADVANCED ELECTRONIC CONTROLS 
CONSUMER EQUIPMENT 
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT 
AIRCRAFT EQU IPMENT 
GENER IC TESTING: 
. CONNECTORS 
. CIRCUIT BOARDS 
.TYPICAL COMPONENT INSTALLATIONS 
VULNERABILITY MODE LING 
Figure 14 
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worry about appliances that may show up on the market with advanced 
electronic controls. Some tests are planned on consumer equipment, 
industrial equipment, and on aircraft equipment. Testing is being 
accomplished and will continue on particular types of connectors 
and circuit boards. Vulnerability models are being developed so 
that it will not be necessary to test every electronic box in the 
country. 
A few conclusions from the work that has been done so far are 
shown on figure 15. It is not difficult to take any specific box 
or any specific installation and do the necessary experiments and 
evaluate that particular installation. However, it still looks 
fairly difficult to do a national risk estimate because of the 
difficulty of modeling things such as complete industries in terms 
of what kinds of equipment they have and how much they may have 
in a plant. It is believed that the use of new technology will 
tend to reduce the risks because of the smaller size, the better 
encapsulation and the lower wattage. To date no problems have 
been encountered with any 110 volt equipment (motors, appliances) 
and none are expected unless electronic controls are used. This 
is primarily because with the 110 volt equipment in general use 
when the fibers cross a pair of nodes, they will burn away. The 
testing that has been done so far of a sample of consumer elec-
tronics indicates very little vulnerability. In fact none were 
found in the group that was tested. More work is indicated on the 
toaster shock hazard analysis in order to determine whether a 
serious problem exist. 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
I. ANY SPECIFIC INSTALLATION CAN BE EVALUATED FOR RISK WITH AVAILABLE TEST 
& ANALYSIS CAPABILITY) HOWEVER; 
2. TO SECURE CONFIDENCE IN A NATIONAL RISK ANALYSIS ADDITIONAL TESTING & 
MODELING IS REQUIRED. 
3. USE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY WILL TEND TO REDUCE THE RISK. 
4. NO PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN ENCOUNTERED TO DATE WITH 110V EQUIPMENT (MOTORS) 
APPLIANCES) AND NONE ARE EXPECTED UNLESS ELECTRONIC CONTROLS ARE USED. 
5. TESTS OF A SAMPLE OF CONSUMER ELECTRONICS INDICATE LITTLE VULNERABILITY. 
6. PRELIMINARY TOASTER SHOCK HAZARD ESTIMATES INDICATE ADDITIONAL EFFORT 
IS REQUIRED. 
Figure 15 
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